I. FIRST DAY: FUNDAMENTALS
Alice: What, exactly, does Bohmian mechanics say?
Bob: It describes the motion of N point particles in the usual three-space. Every particle i has at every time t some definite position Q i (t)R 3 . The motion obeys the first-order differential equation where Im means the imaginary part, m i is the mass of particle i, and ⌿ is a time-dependent complex-valued function on the configuration space R 3N that satisfies Schrödinger's equation
where V is the potential energy. ͑We denote the variables on which ⌿ depends by q, and the actual positions of the particles by Q.) Alice: And this mechanics is intended to replace nonrelativistic quantum mechanics? Bob: Yes. The idea is that Bohmian mechanics is the true quantum mechanics. The ⌿ function is the very same wave function you know from quantum mechanics, and the positions of the particles are the same you would find if you performed a position measurement in quantum mechanics. Alice: So the Bohmian answer to ''wave or particle?'' is ''wave and particle!'' Bob: Yes. Alice: But, it's very different from the usual quantum mechanics conceptually, isn't it? Indeed, it's not a quantum theory at all; it's a classical theory. Bob: It is indeed very different from the usual quantum mechanics conceptually. Usually, it is assumed that quantum particles don't have trajectories. Bohmian mechanics has in common with classical theories that it tells us a clear story about what's happening. On the other hand, as we will soon see, Bohmian mechanics is in perfect agreement with all probabilistic predictions of quantum mechanics. So, you are mistaken thinking that Bohmian mechanics is not a quantum theory; remember that its empirical implications agree with quantum mechanics ͑whenever quantum mechanics is unambiguous͒, and disagree with Newtonian mechanics. A corollary of this agreement is that Bohmian mechanics is confirmed by experience. In particular, the mere existence of Bohmian mechanics proves that the usually assumed nonexistence of trajectories cannot be concluded from experiment. Alice: You will have to explain the agreement with the predictions of quantum mechanics. But, first I have some questions on the dynamics. Apparently, you have to assume that the wave function is not merely square integrable, but is differentiable. Bob: We do assume that the wave function is differentiable ͑except perhaps at a few exceptional configurations͒. Alice: For all times?
Bob: For all times. For a reasonably large class of potentials ͑including Coulomb͒, there is a dense subspace in the L 2 Hilbert space of wave functions that will be differentiable for all times ͑with few exceptional configurations͒. Alice: And the equation of motion is ill-defined for all nodes, that is, zeros, of the wave function. What if your trajectory (Q 1 (t),...,Q N (t)) runs into a node? Bob: It has been proved 1 that for almost all initial configurations ͑according to the appropriate measure͒ and for all wave functions from a suitable class, the equation of motion has a unique global solution ͑that is, for all t). Hence, with ''probability one'' Bohmian trajectories never run into the singularities of the velocity field, that is, the nodes and the points where the wave function is not differentiable. Alice: What is this appropriate measure?
Bob: The natural measure for counting initial configurations ͑that is, for talking about the size of a set of initial configurations͒ for the equation of motion with wave function ⌿(tϭ0) is
where d 3N q is the volume measure on configuration space. The measure ͑3͒ defines a measure on the set of solution curves (Q 1 (t),...,Q N (t)) of the equation of motion. Alice: Why don't we simply count initial conditions by the volume measure? Bob: For every measure on configuration space, the dynamics will transport its density function (q 1 ,...,q N ,t) according to the continuity equation
͑4͒
If we start with the volume measure, that is, ϭ1, at some time, the measure will cease to be the volume measure at other times. To see why, we have to distinguish again between the wave function ⌿ of the universe and the wave function of a subsystem. Because the evolution of ⌿ is described by Eq. ͑2͒ at all times, ⌿ never collapses, as you said. In contrast, the wave function of the part of the universe on which we do an experiment does effectively collapse as a consequence of Eqs. ͑1͒ and ͑2͒. Alice: You mean, you can derive the collapse from Eqs. ͑1͒
and ͑2͒? It is well known that the collapse is nonunitary and therefore is in conflict with the Schrödinger evolution! Bob: We can derive the collapse. You will see. For simplicity, we consider a ''measurement'' with only two possible outcomes. And, let us first suppose a special form of the wave function of the universe, ⌿ϭ ⌽, where is the wave function of the subsystem on which we perform the ''measurement,'' is the wave function of the measuring apparatus, and ⌽ is that of the rest of the world. The symbol denotes the tensor product of functions, that is, ⌿(x,y,z)ϭ(x)(y)⌽(z), where x,y,z are the configurations of subsystem, apparatus, and the rest of the world, respectively. ⌽ will be irrelevant to our discussion, so we ignore it here. Alice: ⌽ is irrelevant because, as long as ⌿ is a product such as (something) ⌽, Eq. ͑1͒ implies that the motion of the subsystem and apparatus particles is independent of what's happening outside. Bob: Yes. Suppose Û is the unitary operator that represents the time evolution of the wave function during the ''measurement'' process. Alice: Wait a second: why do you always put these quotation marks around the word ''measurement?'' Bob: Because we should not expect that anything is actually being measured during what is usually called a ''measurement.'' I'll return to this point later. Alice: Hm. Go on.
Bob: Suppose 0 is the wave function of the apparatus before the measurement, 1 is that corresponding to the result 1, and 2 is that corresponding to result 2. If 1 is the eigenfunction corresponding to result 1 and 2 the eigenfunction corresponding to result 2, we must have that
Now if ϭc 1 1 ϩc 2 2 is not an eigenfunction of the self-adjoint operator ͑the ''observable''͒ corresponding to this ''measurement,'' then the linearity of the Schrödinger equation implies that
The wave functions 1 and 2 will have very disjoint configurational support, that is, 1 and 2 are supported by the sets S 1 and S 2 , respectively, in the configuration space of the apparatus particles, and these two sets will not only be disjoint, but very far apart in configuration space, as they are macroscopically distinct. ͑The wave function 1 will not strictly be zero outside S 1 , but will be very close to zero, such that, say, 99.9% of ͉ 1 ͉ 2 will be concentrated in S 1 ; similarly for 2 and S 2 .) Alice: Then, if the result is displayed by the position of a pointer ͑with 10 23 particles͒ on a scale, all configurations in S i will have the positions of all pointer par-ticles close to i, and so the elements of S 1 and S 2 will differ by one length unit in at least 10 23 variables. Bob: Yes. For all practical purposes, it will be impossible to have any interference between the two wave packets on the right-hand side of Eq. ͑7͒, because for interference, the supports of the two packets have to overlap in configuration space. Alice: I see.
Bob: So far we have discussed only the wave function. Now, in Bohmian mechanics, the configuration point of subsystemϩapparatus will be, thanks to the quantum equilibrium hypothesis, random and distributed according to ͉c 1 1 1 ϩc 2 2 2 ͉ 2 , which for disjointness of supports equals
Therefore, the configuration point will reside in the set ͕subsystem configurations͖ϫS 1 with probability ͉c 1 ͉ 2 , and in the set ͕subsystem configurations͖ϫS 2 with probability ͉c 2 ͉ 2 . Note that this result coincides with the probability predictions of quantum mechanics. Furthermore, if the configuration point resides in the first set, the output of the apparatus will ͑unambiguously͒ read 1. Alice: And, in this case, where is the collapsed wave function of the subsystem after the measurement? Bob: The future motion of the configuration point will depend only on the first wave packet c 1 1 1 because, as you can see in Eq. ͑1͒, the velocity depends only on the value of the wave function and its derivatives at the configuration point (Q 1 (t),...,Q N (t)), and the two wave packets never meet again. Alice: Aha. Furthermore, I recall that product wave functions such as c 1 1 1 lead to independent motion of subsystem and apparatus, and I can read off from Eq. ͑1͒ that c 1 1 generates the same motion as 1 because c 1 cancels in the quotient. Hence, the subsystem behaves as if it had wave function 1 . Bob: Yes. Alice: But somehow, I missed the point where the collapse comes about. Bob: If x,y,z are again the configuration of the subsystem, the apparatus and the rest of the world, respectively, and X(t),Y (t),Z(t) is the solution of Eq. ͑1͒, we call cond (x,t)ϭ⌿(x,Y (t),Z(t),t) the conditional wave function of the subsystem. As long as there is no interaction between the subsystem and anything else, the conditional wave function obeys a Schrödinger equation, but ceases to do so during interaction. The conditional wave function collapses, but not so the wave function of the universe. And, in contrast to the orthodox collapse, the collapse of cond takes place objectively, takes a finite amount of time, and does not depend on an observer's knowledge. Alice: What happens to the second wave packet, c 2 2 2 ?
Bob: It leads an empty life. It evolves according to Schrö-dinger's equation, but it doesn't influence the configuration. Alice: But if ⌿ never collapses, it isn't a product 1 (something) after the experiment. And, we assumed it is a product in the beginning of our discussion of the measurement process. So, how do you treat any further measurement?
while the support of ⌿ Ќ is macroscopically disjoint from that of ⌽ ͑which contains the configuration point͒; then, our discussion still applies. In this case is called the effective wave function of the subsystem, 2 and 1 is the effective wave function of the subsystem after the ''measurement.'' Alice: If I understand you correctly, the outcome of the measurement in general depends on the microstate, that is, the configuration and the wave function, of the measurement apparatus. In particular, it depends on the details of , and these details are subject to thermal fluctuations. Bob: In principle, yes. But, for practically relevant experiments, it turns out that the configuration of the apparatus and the details of its wave function don't influence the outcome. The origin of the randomness is the unknown subsystem configuration. But, different experimental arrangements corresponding to the same self-adjoint operator may lead to different outcomes for the same and the same subsystem configuration. Alice: So, the outcome can't be predicted given a self-adjoint operator and the state ͑configuration, wave function͒ of the subsystem? Bob: In many cases, it can't. That's why ''measurement'' is quite a misnomer in this context, because it isn't at all a property of the subsystem that is being ''measured.'' Alice: According to Bohmian mechanics. But, in other interpretations... Bob: At least you don't know in general. Ask yourself how you know that a different apparatus ͑''measuring'' the same ''observable''͒ acting on the same subsystem wouldn't have given a different ''measurement'' result. Alice: I'll have to think about this. In quantum mechanics ''measurement'' is never understood in the sense of simply revealing a preexisting quantity, but rather of forcing nature to choose a value. Bob: All the more reason to regard the word ''measurement'' as a misnomer. The word suggests a meaning in the outcomes which in general the outcomes don't have. Nobody would call throwing a die a measurement, as the outcome is not a preexisting quantity. Alice: What about the famous quantum paradoxes in Bohmian mechanics? Bob: They get resolved ͑see, for example, Ref. 3͒. Because
Bohmian mechanics describes the motion of objectively existing particles, there can't be any paradoxes.
II. SECOND DAY: BOHMIAN VERSUS ORTHODOX QUANTUM MECHANICS
Alice: I see that Bohmian mechanics is a possible explanation of the quantum world. But, the particle trajectories can't be observed! Bob: The word ''observe'' is somewhat ambiguous. Strictly speaking, in a Bohmian universe, the particle paths actually can be observed. Let's consider, for example, a single particle, in a double-slit experiment. We finally observe the position of the arrival of every single particle on the screen and, because the equation of motion is of first order in time, we can calculate the entire trajectory from this position. For instance, we can decide whether the particle passed the left or the right slit, without disturbing the interference pattern: for symmetry reasons, all particles that passed the left slit hit the left half of the screen, while those that passed the right slit hit the right half of the screen. Alice: But, your last proposition cannot be tested empirically.
Bob: It cannot be tested empirically. But, it's common for physical theories to have implications that cannot be tested empirically. Alice: I didn't have in mind that you could ''observe'' the trajectory by calculating it. Bob: Most observations, be it the mass of the sun or the charge of the electron, are not done directly, but involve calculations. I understand, of course, that you had in mind detecting the particle's position every tenth of a second. But, the interaction involved with this detection would influence the particle's future motion, so we won't see the trajectory the particle would have followed if its position hadn't been detected ͑though what we observe is a Bohmian trajectory as well͒. It's well known that detecting the particle at the slits of a double-slit experiment will make the interference fringes disappear. Alice: Hence, the trajectory cannot be seriously observed, and the equation of motion cannot be tested directly. Bob: Neither can the Schrödinger equation as we can't observe wave functions. Alice: Why can't we observe wave functions?
Bob: Assume I prepare an atom with a certain wave function and I give it to you. You can't find out the wave function if I don't tell you. Alice: I see. This fact follows indeed from the mathematical rules of the quantum formalism. But, if you give me a million atoms with the same wave function, I can determine the wave function. Bob: Yes, but I don't give you a million, I give you a single one. Alice: But, it's not clear if the wave function is something real. It may be rather the description of our knowledge about the particle. Bob: Let's consider a gedanken experiment. Suppose a computer chooses a wave function randomly and prepares an atom with this wave function. Then, it prints out some data defining a pair of orthogonal subspaces of the Hilbert space, one of them containing the wave function it had chosen. And, then it prints out a note that says which of the two subspaces contained the chosen wave function, puts it into an envelope, and seals it. After that, the computer erases its knowledge about the wave function. Now, nobody knows the wave function of this atom, and nobody can possibly find out. But, nature still remembers the wave function of this atom, because we can, according to the rules of the quantum-mechanical formalism, carry out an experiment that has the two subspaces mentioned earlier as eigenspaces, break the seal, and compare the prediction with the actual result. ͑Strictly speaking, agreement between prediction and result doesn't imply the wave function was contained in one of the subspaces, but the whole procedure can be repeated, and the computer's prediction is always true.͒ According to the formalism, the machine can only accomplish certainty of its predictions if the wave function actually lies in the predicted subspace. So, the wave function of the atom is well defined ͑or ''known to nature'' or ''real''͒ even in those cases when nobody is aware of it. Alice: Strictly speaking, you gave an example of one case in which the wave function is well defined although nobody knows it. This example doesn't imply it is always well defined. Bob: Strictly speaking, you're right about that. But, it suggests that wave functions are always well defined, and at least it shows that the wave function is not merely a mathematical expression of the observer's knowledge. And, it shows that there exist things we can't observe. Alice: If I understand you properly, what you're emphasizing is we can't directly check Schrödinger's equation by means of ͑i͒ measuring the wave function ͑without disturbing it͒; ͑ii͒ letting it evolve an amount of time; ͑iii͒ measuring the wave function again; and ͑iv͒ comparing the result with a numerical extrapolation using Schrödinger's equation. Bob: Yes. Isn't that true? Alice: Certainly. And, you're saying I shouldn't complain about invisible trajectories as long as I accept Schrö-dinger's equation. Bob: You can put it that way. You can, of course, test both Eqs. ͑1͒ and ͑2͒ by their more indirect consequences. Alice: But, how do I know the correct description of reality is Bohmian mechanics rather than any other interpretation of quantum mechanics? Bob: There is hardly any other interpretation that is consistent, accepts the existence of an outside reality, and agrees with the predictions of the quantum formalism. ͑For discussions of other interpretations, see Refs. 4 and 5.͒ In fact, the formalism itself suggests Bohmian mechanics. Let me explain how. Recall that the formalism states that the wave function evolves according to Schrödinger's equation unless we perform a ''formal measurement.'' Every formal measurement is characterized by a self-adjoint operator, the possible ''measurement results'' are the eigenvalues of this operator, the probability of a certain result is the norm squared... Alice: ... of the projection of the wave function to the corresponding eigenspace, and this projection is the new wave function that remains after the ''formal measurement.'' Bob: Note that there is an ambiguity in the formalism because it is not completely clear which processes are formal measurements. In particular, we might either guess the wave function of the measurement apparatus, use Schrödinger's equation for calculating the wave function of the composite system (object ϩapparatus) after the measurement, and then invoke the collapse rule when reading off the pointer position ͑or computer printout͒, or we might guess the selfadjoint operator corresponding to this apparatus and right away assume a collapse of the object wave function. Alice: It is well known and easy to show that this ambiguity does not influence the set of possible results nor their probabilities or probabilities for future formal measurements, and hence the formalism is unambiguous.
Bob: In so far as macroscopic predictions are concerned. But, because we saw that the wave function ͑of the composite system͒ is well defined in reality, the question arises: when does the wave function collapse in reality? If you find it difficult to believe that the universe switches off the natural evolution law for a moment in favor of a different dynamics collapsing the wave function, then apparently the wave function never collapses. In this case, however, the wave function of the composite system will, in general, be a superposition of very different states, including different laboratory protocols or whatever ͓cf. Eq. ͑7͔͒. In particular, the result is not encoded in this wave function. Neither is there any randomness appearing. Therefore, the wave function cannot be the complete description of the state of the composite system. There have to be additional variables that contain the actual result of the formal measurement. Alice: I suppose that whoever says that the orthodox view of quantum mechanics is wrong should explain where mistakes were made on the way leading to this view. Bob: The founders of quantum mechanics were much attracted by the thought that the words ''momentum,'' ''energy,'' and ''angular momentum'' still have a meaning in quantum mechanics. These words, however, don't have an immediate meaning ͑in contrast to ''position,'' which does͒; their meaning in Newtonian mechanics comes from the fact that they are conserved quantities. Without this fact, nobody would be interested in multiplying mass by velocity. Now, Newtonian mechanics has turned out wrong, so naively we should expect that these words cease to have a meaning. But, Heisenberg and others insisted they have a meaning. The idea was that to define a physical quantity means to specify how to measure it. 6 But, this is a dangerous strategy because you don't know whether your result depends on the details of your measurement arrangement. There's no problem with defining a quantity by specifying how to measure it as long as you can predict the values. Then, you can be sure the value didn't depend on the arrangement. But, there is a problem as soon as the values are random. You don't even know you measured anything meaningful, because whatever definition-in-terms-of-howto-measure you choose, it will always produce some result. And, it is interesting which definitions Heisenberg chose: the definitions he gave were always such that in a Newtonian world, they would have measured the Newtonian value ͑of momentum, energy, or angular momentum, respectively͒. Isn't that strange? Shouldn't we suspect that the correct experimental arrangement for measuring momentum ͑if such a quantity exists͒ in a world whose rules differ from Newton's might differ from that in Newton's world? Insisting on the belief that Newtonian momentum ͑energy, angular momentum͒ measurements reveal the momentum ͑energy, angular momentum͒ leads to the orthodox view of quantum mechanics. Alice: Is there an ''actual momentum'' in Bohmian mechanics like the ''actual position?'' Bob: You might define mQ as the actual momentum ͑but it is not a conserved quantity͒, or you might define ͉͗(Ϫiប)ٌ͉͘ as the actual momentum ͑which is a conserved quantity as long as translation invariance is satisfied͒. But, I doubt that such a definition will be helpful for calculations or for anything, as these quantities need not agree with the outcome of a ''momentum measurement.'' Alice: There is a pretty symmetry in quantum mechanics between position and momentum. Bohmian mechanics destroys that symmetry. Bob: There is no such symmetry in quantum mechanics.
The But, that doesn't mean there is a symmetry in classical electrodynamics between physical ͑position͒ space and Fourier space. 
III. THIRD DAY: SPECIAL ISSUES

